Formal Verification for Ethereum


Amsterdam, 3 May 2017 Yoichi Hirai


"formal" verification?



http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/10803323/Why-cant-we-make-drama-like-The-Pallisers-anymore.html

"formal" comes from formalised math






formal proofs on twitter

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.@pirapira Provable. (pwl

 $A \wedge B \rightarrow B$: Provable. Proof tree (intuitionistic):



Use proof checkers against lots of cases

• Kepler's conjecture "




is the most compact"

- one needs to see all other ways are less efficient
- This involves checking lots of corner cases.
 Flyspeck project (led by Thomas Hales) used
 Isabelle and HOL-light
- (That sounds useful for software development too.)

Proving software correct

using interactive proof assistants



- they use only ~20 inference rules to derive the whole math
- ... and that code matches specification

Steps for Proving Ethereum contracts correct

- Ethereum Virtual Machine for theorem provers
- Test the EVM in the provers against other implementations
- Use the EVM for proving byte code correct against specifications

Proving smart contracts correct!

	Isabelle2016 - Deed.thy		
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Deed.thy (~/src/eth-isabel e/example/)			
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<pre>apply(drule star_case; auto)</pre>			
<pre>apply(case_tac steps; auto)</pre>			
<pre>apply(split strict_if_split; auto)</pre>			
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<pre>proof (prove) goal (7 subgoals): 1. \[\[\] a initial_call aa bal origin ext block act st bala o</pre>	ial_call \implies .82036848327162830196 alue initial_call $=$ amToWorld (act, st, k	> oala, opt_v)))) ≠ O)	\Rightarrow

The proof finishes somehow

-	Isabelle2015 - Deed.thy
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theorem	
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	https://github.com/pirapira/eth-isabelle

Did you prove the right thing?

• The account should not do anything wrong.

The balance should not decrease unless an authorised account tells so.

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• The account should not do anything wrong.

The balance should not decrease unless an authorised account tells so.

A non-authorised account cannot authorise any account.

It's not just about one Ethereum contract... Verifying Ethereum as a Whole

- Theorem (Sami Mäkelä): No Ethereum transaction can increase the total amount of Ether.
- Q. How can the total amount of Ether decrease?



What is Casper

- Ethereum's coming consensus mechanism.
- Several different Casper protocols

 <u>https://github.com/ethereum/research/tree/master/casper</u>
 <u>https://github.com/ethereum/research/tree/master/</u>
 <u>casper3</u>
 <u>https://github.com/ethereum/research/tree/master/</u>
 <u>casper4</u>
 Vlad's Casper
 Meredith's Casper(s)
- Not easy to comprehend everything

Consensus

- The whole thing is for avoiding forks (or double-spends)
- PBFT (practical byzantine fault tolerance) has "2/3 honest implies no fork"
- To make it cryptoeconomic, we need: "If a fork happens, 1/3 of the deposits can be forfeited"


Proof-of-stake requires blaming bad behaviours

- "If 2/3 are honest, everything stays good" is not enough
- "if something goes bad, some participants can be penalised" is better
- Alice: "I sent it" Bob: "I didn't receive it"
- Blaming a single party is much better.

Slashing conditions

- if a fork happens, some 1/3 should be blamed for violating slashing conditions (signing contradicting "commit" messages / signing "commit" messages without evidence / signing "prepare" messages without evidence / signing "commit" message between two "prepare")
- many modes of failures because everyone can do whatever
- theorem prover to check all failure modes

Whenever there is a fork, some slashing condition is violated



but the pictures help only as much.

theorem

 ${\bf lemma} \ accountable {\it -safety}:$

 $\begin{array}{l} \textit{validator-sets-finite } s \implies \\ v \ge 0 \implies \\ \textit{fork-with-commits } s \ (h, \ v) \ (h1, \ v1) \ (h2, \ v2) \implies \\ \exists \ h' \ v'. \\ \textit{ancestor-descendant-with-chosen-validators } s \ (h, \ v) \ (h', \ v') \ \land \\ \textit{one-third-of-fwd-or-rear-slashed } s \ h' \\ \langle proof \rangle \end{array}$

Links

- @pirapira on Twitter
- pirapira on GitHub
- <u>github.com/pirapira/eth-isabelle</u> Smart contract verification
- <u>github.com/pirapira/pos</u> Casper verification
- yoichi@ethereum.org